A Review of Iran’s Socio-Political Developments in 2025
Chronology of Events in Iran in 2025
This report provides an overview of the most significant political, human rights, and social developments in Iran during the 2025 calendar year.
The intensification of international pressures on Iran, the escalation of systematic human rights violations inside the country, and the continued social resistance, particularly among ethnic minorities, workers, nurses, retirees, and women, were among the defining features of the past year.
In the realm of foreign policy, the Iranian regime oscillated between limited diplomacy and open confrontation in 2025. On the one hand, indirect talks between Iran and the United States, mediated by Oman, began in April, creating cautious speculation about containing tensions. On the other hand, the 12-day war in June between Iran and Israel, accompanied by direct U.S. involvement, followed by the activation of the “snapback” mechanism and the return of UN Security Council sanctions in September, demonstrated that Iran’s relations with the West remained highly fragile. At a time when Iran had largely lost its proxy forces, this duality, negotiation alongside gesture of capability for any confrontation, constituted the main framework of Iran’s foreign policy over the past year.
Domestically, the human rights situation in 2025 deteriorated sharply. Reports by the United Nations and independent human rights organizations indicated one of the highest execution rates in recent decades. Capital punishment, together with widespread arrests, harsh sentences, and the absence of fair trials, was used by the Islamic Republic as a primary tool of political and social control. Numerous reports and pieces of evidence show that the regime’s human rights violations disproportionately targeted ethnic minorities, particularly Baluch, Kurds, and Arabs. These pressures, whether in the form of executions, security raids, arrests of local activists, or the suppression of regional protests, were among the most prominent human rights issues of the year.
Throughout 2025, Iranian society across all regions witnessed the continuation and diversification of forms of social discontent and resistance. Labor protests and strikes, especially in response to the cost-of-living crisis, continued throughout the year. At the same time, women’s resistance to compulsory hijab became firmly established as one of the most enduring and successful forms of social resistance. Security crackdowns on cultural and identity-based practices, including during Nowruz celebrations in Kurdish regions, showed that the government continues to view the national identities of Iran’s peoples and their cultural demands through a security lens.
During the past year, environmental crises intensified. The drying of lakes and wetlands, shrinking reservoirs behind dams, shortages of drinking water, and persistent air pollution in most cities became major issues affecting the health and daily lives of people across Iran.
Overall, the findings of this report indicate that the dominant model of governance in Iran during 2025 can be described as “limited diplomacy abroad, increased and widespread repression at home.” While the government sought to preserve its stability through a combination of negotiation, military deterrence, and security control inside the country, the cost of this approach was borne mainly by marginalized groups, ethnic minorities, women, civil activists, and lower-income classes. The year 2025 can thus be assessed as a period in which the gap between the ruling regime and society deepened, laying the groundwork for persistent and escalating tensions in the year ahead.
January to April 2025: Intensification of Internal Pressures and the Return of Nuclear Diplomacy
In January 2025, Iran began the new year amid an economic crisis and severe livelihood pressures that fueled continued labor protests, particularly by retirees and workers. The infamous judges Razini and Moghiseh were shot dead by an employee of the judiciary.
International human rights bodies warned about the high number of executions, announcing that Iran had executed more than 900 people in the previous year. [1] At the same time, human rights monitors inside Iran reported figures significantly higher than those cited by the United Nations. In several provinces, especially Kurdistan, reports emerged of arrests of citizens and local activists, indicating the continuation of the government’s security-oriented approach to identity-based demands.[2]
In February, foreign policy developments became more prominent. Demonstrations by opposition groups abroad and the imposition of new U.S. sanctions on officials and institutions linked to the suppression of protests further shaped the international climate surrounding Iran.[3]
Inside the country, reports pointed to a sharp increase in livelihood-related and economic protests. Human rights organizations also warned about the risk of imminent executions of political and security prisoners.
March witnessed a simultaneous escalation of internal and external pressures. The UN Special Rapporteur at the Human Rights Council expressed concern over systematic patterns of human rights violations in Iran, including executions, the lack of fair trials, and the suppression of freedom of expression.[4] During the same month, the arrest of Kurdish citizens during Nowruz ceremonies in Kurdish regions highlighted the link between security control and the management of cultural occasions.[5]
Internationally, verbal tensions between Tehran and Washington over Iran’s nuclear program intensified.
In April 2025, indirect talks between Iran and the United States, mediated by Oman, began and were described by both sides as “positive” and “constructive.”[6] At the same time, human rights reports documented an unprecedented surge in executions during this month, emphasizing that activists from various national minority movements, particularly Baluch, Kurds, and Arabs, were disproportionately represented among those executed.[7]
Overall, the concurrent intensification of domestic repression and the continuation of foreign diplomacy shaped the Islamic Republic’s general policy in 2025.
May to August 2025: Social Protests, a Short War, and the Securitization of Space
In May, while Iran continued nuclear negotiations with the United States and Europe, widespread strikes inside the country, including a nationwide truck drivers’ strike, reflected the depth of the economic crisis. At the same time, human rights organizations warned of the ongoing wave of executions, viewing this trend as evidence of executions by hanging serving as a pillar of social control in Iran.[8]
June 2025 marked a turning point in Iran’s political developments. The outbreak of direct confrontation between Iran and Israel, followed by U.S. attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, resulted in a brief but consequential military clash. After the ceasefire, reports indicated a tightening of the security atmosphere inside the country, particularly in Kurdish and Baluch regions, where arrests and security pressures increased.[9]
In July, the security repercussions of the June war continued in Iran. A raid by security forces on the village of Gounich in Sistan-Baluchestan, resulting in the killing and injury of civilians, sparked local protests and human rights concerns.[10] During the same month, human rights networks reported increased arrests of Kurdish activists and intensified human rights violations in regions such as Kurdistan, Baluchestan, Khuzestan (Ahvaz region), and others.
In August, human rights reporting focused on the situation of political prisoners and the imminent risk of executions. UN reports covering the period from January to July highlighted systematic human rights violations, particularly the denial of the right to a fair trial.[11]
September to December 2025: Return of Sanctions, Escalating Repression, and Intensifying Environmental Crises
In September 2025, with the activation of the “snapback” mechanism by three European countries, UN Security Council sanctions against Iran were reinstated. At the same time, human rights organizations reported that following the June war, a new wave of repression under the banner of “national security” had begun, disproportionately targeting ethnic minority activists, especially Baluch and Kurds.[12]
October and November saw new records in the number of executions. Reports showed that executions were increasingly used as the primary tool of political and social control, with regions such as Kurdistan, Baluchestan, and Ahvaz accounting for a large share of those executed.[13] Simultaneously, some media reports spoke of a “dual governance” pattern: a relative easing of certain social restrictions alongside intensified political repression.
In November and early December, air pollution and water shortages became among the main problems facing people in cities across Iran. School closures, the suspension of sporting events, and other social activities effectively confined large segments of the urban population to their homes. Official government reports indicated more than 60,000 deaths annually due to air pollution, heightening public concern. Widespread forest fires in various regions, particularly in the Hyrcanian forests of northern Iran, where timely action was not taken, alarmed local residents and environmental experts.[14] Public protests and concerns over water and electricity shortages and declining reservoir levels forced government officials to respond. Regime president, Pezeshkian, proposed relocating the capital as a solution to the crisis, a claim widely dismissed by experts as baseless given the government’s economic bankruptcy.[15]
In December, the implementation of death sentences in political cases, UN experts’ warnings about the risk of executing women, the arrest of religious minorities and Baluch prisoners, and the continued detention of Kurdish activists further darkened the human rights situation at year’s end.[16] In foreign policy, verbal confrontations between Iran and the United States at the UN Security Council over the deadlock in nuclear negotiations and the return of sanctions continued, while women’s civil disobedience against compulsory hijab persisted as one of the most enduring forms of social resistance.[17]
The assassination of Mr. Khosrow Alikordi in the second half of December and events surrounding his memorial ceremony led to the arrest of more than 50 political and human rights activists, including Nobel Peace Prize laureate Narges Mohammadi, by security forces in Mashhad. These arrests triggered a wave of condemnation from prominent figures and reputable international institutions.[18]
The fragile and unstable economic situation of the Islamic Republic further deteriorated in 2025. The allocation of a limited portion of oil-smuggling revenues in the second half of the year to rebuilding proxy forces damaged over the past two years, continued embezzlement by officials, and international sanctions caused the exchange rates of foreign currencies, gold prices, gasoline, and basic necessities to rise daily and exponentially. On the eve of the new calendar year, the government’s economic conditions were such that any short- or medium-term prospect of exiting the current crisis appeared impossible.
In sum, an examination of developments in 2025 shows that the Islamic Republic of Iran sought to project an image of stability through limited and conciliatory diplomacy abroad coupled with increased domestic repression. The trend of human rights violations, particularly the rise in executions and security crackdowns in regions inhabited by ethnic minorities such as Kurds, Baluch, and Arabs, demonstrated that the cost of this show of stability was borne by human rights and political activists. The year 2025 can thus be seen as a defining point in which the gap between state and society widened, social protests increased, and the pattern of “begging diplomacy abroad, repression at home” became entrenched as the dominant characteristic of the Islamic Republic.
Sources:
- 1- Reuters, Jan 7, 2025
- 2- Hengaw, Jan 27, 2025
- 3- Reuters; U.S. Treasury, Feb 6, 2025
- 4- OHCHR, Mar 18, 2025
- 5- IranWire, Mar 28, 2025
- 6- Reuters, Apr 12, 2025
- 7- Iran Human Rights; HRW, Apr–May 2025
- 8- HRW, May 27, 2025
- 9- Reuters, June 24–25, 2025
- 10- Wikipedia / گزارشهای حقوق بشری، July 2025
- 11- UN Doc A/80/349, Aug 2025
- 12- Amnesty International, Sep 2025
- 13- Iran Human Rights, Oct–Nov 2025
- 14- iran-e-sabz.org Nov-27 2025
- 15- khabaronline.ir Nov-20 2025
- 16- usflhr.org, Dec 2025
- 17- The Guardian, Dec 2025
- 18- ABC News, Dec-21 2025